1514 http://dx.doi.org/10.36418/syntax-literate.v5i12.948
Syntax Literate: Jurnal Ilmiah Indonesia p–ISSN: 2541-0849
e-ISSN: 2548-1398
Vol. 5, No. 12, Desember 2020
POWER, TRUST, AND INSTITUTION: TAX AUTHORITY VS TAXPAYER IN
INDONESIA
David Mondru Sihotang
Universitas Indonesia Depok Jawa Barat, Indonesia
Email: [email protected]
Abstract
This study aims to estimates tax compliance in a relationship between power of
authority and trust in authority in Indonesia, and how institution plays key role to
shape tax reform. Using the aggregate data of individuals and firms per region tax
office in all provinces in Indonesia in 10 years of taxing period (2008-2017) in time-
fixed effect model, we found that soft and medium approach in power of authority
gives significant effect in increasing tax compliance. However, other findings show
that the higher taxpayer income, the lower the tax compliance. In addition, Java,
Bali and Nusa Tenggara still give higher compliance than the other location in
Indonesia. Tax reform needs institution as a rule to adapt in taxpayer behavior and
understand the compliance risk.
Keywords: institution; power of authority; tax authority; tax compliance; trust in
authority
Abstrak
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk memperkirakan kepatuhan pajak dalam hubungan
antara kekuatan otoritas dan kepercayaan terhadap otoritas di Indonesia dan
bagaimana institusi memainkan peran kunci untuk membentuk reformasi perpajakan.
Menggunakan data agregat individu dan perusahaan per kantor pajak daerah di
seluruh provinsi di Indonesia dalam 10 tahun periode perpajakan (2008-2017) dalam
model efek tetap waktu, kami menemukan bahwa pendekatan lunak dan menengah
dalam kekuasaan otoritas memberikan efek signifikan dalam meningkatkan
kepatuhan pajak. Namun, temuan lain menunjukkan bahwa pendapatan wajib pajak
yang lebih tinggi, semakin rendah kepatuhan pajak. Selain itu, Jawa, Bali, dan Nusa
Tenggara juga masih memberikan kepatuhan yang lebih tinggi dibandingkan lokasi
lainnya di Indonesia. Reformasi perpajakan membutuhkan institusi sebagai aturan
untuk beradaptasi dalam perilaku wajib pajak dan memahami risiko kepatuhan.
Kata kunci: lembaga; kuasa hukum; otoritas pajak; kepatuhan pajak; kepercayaan
terhadap otoritas
Introduction
Most countries still rely on tax revenue to support the running of their country,
regardless tax issues are always struggling with tax compliance. To achieve high tax
compliance, the cooperation between tax authority and taxpayer is needed, if it cannot
say a good relationship. However, the attitude of taxpayers to comply are resulted from
David Mondru Sihotang
Syntax Literate, Vol. 5, No. 12, Desember 2020 1515
different motives, mostly are the cost for non-compliance is too high or they feel
responsible as a citizen and members of the community (Wahl, I., Kastlunger, B., &
Kirchler, 2010). Therefore, tax regulation is required to capture the taxpayer’s motives
and the given authority for tax authority to ensure the tax administration run well.
Most recent studies have been conducted to study deeply how both tax authority
and taxpayer having role in the tax compliance. Regulation and power are believed to be
determinant factors as policy tools to enhance tax compliance, such as audit rates and
fines. Moreover, hard approaches are often used to provide a deterrent effect. This angle
of perspectives had brought researchers in many years ago to study more in this area
includes perception of audit rates, penalty rates, fines (financial or non-financial), and
investigation which affect compliance (Alm, J., Bahl, R., & Murray, 1993), (Fortin,
Lacroix, & Villeval, 2007), (Wahl, I., Kastlunger, B., & Kirchler, 2010), (Allingham &
Sandmo, 1972), (Yitzhaki, 1974). However, those factors often show inconsistent effects
on tax compliance because many studies have shown that majority of people are willing
to pay taxes (Wahl, I., Kastlunger, B., & Kirchler, 2010).
In the same way, regulation and power of authorities cannot stand alone. Tax
compliance always need interaction and relationship between taxpayer and tax authority.
The attitude of taxpayer is needed to be considered as unit that cannot be separated.
Motivations to comply with tax law are often based on enforced and voluntary
cooperation, therefore how people perceive the law and the power of authority is
interested to deeply explore. Some studies found that social and institutional
environment in individuals (Faizal, Palil, Maelah, & Ramli, 2017), (Hessing, Elffers,
Robben, & Webley, 1992), (Wenzel, 2004), and trust in institution as well (Feld & Frey,
2003) affect the compliance. The interaction between power of tax authority and trust in
authority brings idea to integrates economics and psychological factor as the social
dilemma framework called slippery slope framework (Wahl, I., Kastlunger, B., &
Kirchler, 2010).
In the following years, the concept of slippery slope framework (Wahl, I.,
Kastlunger, B., & Kirchler, 2010) had been translated in the theoretical and practical
terms. Practically, changes in dynamics of interactions provide an opportunity for tax
authorities to improve the service climate and trust to improve compliance (Gangl,
Hofmann, & Kirchler, 2015). Furthermore, other experimental study found out that even
though trust and power shows positively effect on tax payment, however in voluntary
compliance, trust increase and power decreases compliance and vice versa on enforced
compliance (Wahl, I., Kastlunger, B., & Kirchler, 2010).
In Indonesia while tax revenue is still a mainstay to support the government
budget, tax compliance issue always leaves problem to be addressed. In the last few
years until 2018, tax revenue has never been reached, not to mention tax compliance that
it is still disappointing. The level of tax compliance with tax reporting is still low. In
2018, there is only 61% from 18 million taxpayers who submit their tax return.
Moreover, Indonesia is currently carrying out tax reform to improve tax administration
system. Some research studies in Indonesia found out that tax morale had a significant
effect in tax compliance, while demographic variable is the strongest factor (Widodo,
Djefris, & Wardhani, 2010). Another experimental study described that understanding of
tax and good sentiment to institution are catalyst to enhance tax compliance
(Parlaungan, 2017).
The latest research in tax compliance in Indonesia brought the idea of slippery
slope of framework to apply in the sense of trust and power climate in Indonesia tax
Power, Trust, and Institution: Tax Authority VS Taxpayer in Indonesia
1516 Syntax Literate, Vol. 5, No. 12, Desember 2020
administration system. The idea is not very common, but it brings insight how to apply
the concept in Indonesia. It results that tax compliance is below the optimum level
where power of authority and trust in authority are above the optimum level (Prihandini,
2018). Moreover, institution is the underlying adaptive changes in society. As a humanly
devised constraint that shape human interaction through time, institution is profound
concept to explain how dimension of learning process take into account (North, 1994).
Method
Based on previous research in the slippery slope framework by (Kircher, 2008),
this study is using the same analytical framework to see the effect of power of
authorities and trust in authority in tax compliance, and how the interaction between
them shape the tax compliance over time. The latest research in Indonesia by
(Prihandini, 2018) had brought the new insight on how the slippery slope framework
can be applied in Indonesia tax administration. Therefore, the empirical analysis in this
research is basically using (Prihandini, 2018) analytical framework, but it is modified in
certain variables and data.
𝑻𝑪 = 𝜶 + 𝜷
𝟏
𝑷𝒐𝑨
𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷
𝟐
𝑻𝒊𝑨
𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷
𝟑
𝑷𝒐𝑨
𝒊𝒕
𝒙 𝑻𝒊𝑨
𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷
𝟒
𝑰𝒏𝒄
𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷
𝟓
𝑳𝒐𝒄
𝒊𝒕
+ ∅
𝒕
+ 𝒁
𝒊
+ 𝒁
𝒊
𝒕 + 𝜺
𝒊𝒕
Where:
i and t = individuals or firms’ data and year;
TC = tax compliance
PoA = power of authority in year t-1
TiA = trust in authority in year t-1
PoA x TiA = the interaction between power of authority and trust in authority
Inc = categorical variables of income of individuals or firms.
For individuals:
a. Inc = 1 (Income ≤ Rp50M),
b. Inc = 2 (Rp50M < Income ≤ Rp250M),
c. Inc = 3 (Rp250M < Income ≤ Rp500M),
d. Inc = 4 (Income > Rp500M).
For firms:
a. Inc = 1 (Income ≤ Rp4,8),
b. Inc = 2 (Rp4,8B < Income ≤ Rp50B),
c. Inc = 3 (Income > Rp50B).
Loc = Loc is categorical variables of region where individuals or firms are
located. The categorical variables for Loc are:
a. Loc = 1 if location in Sumatera,
b. Loc = 2 if location is in Java, Bali, and Nusa Tenggara,
c. Loc = 3 if location is in Kalimantan,
d. Loc = 4 if location is in Sulawesi and North Maluku, and
e. Loc = 5 if location is in Papua and Maluku;
∅ = individual or firms fixed effect;
Z = time fixed effect;
Z x t = Individual/firms in specific time trends; and
𝜀 = the error terms.
In this research, we estimate the model using fixed-effect method. However,
income and location as control variables are also important things to put attention to,
David Mondru Sihotang
Syntax Literate, Vol. 5, No. 12, Desember 2020 1517
therefore this research uses pooled least square to find out how categorical variables
show the effects of them in tax compliance model.
Data in this research are primarily collected from internal data tax authority in
Indonesia, Directorate General of Taxes from period 2008-2017. Different from latest
research by (Prihandini, 2018) which using 105 companies listed in Indonesia Stock
Exchange in 2013, this research uses bigger data, if it cannot say population data in
certain period in Indonesia. Data is an aggregate number of individuals and firms’
taxpayer or declared letter by tax authority per region tax office in all provinces in
Indonesia. Initially, we collect the data by sending the formal request to conduct
research in Directorate General of Tax (DGT), Indonesia and DGT gave the permission
to use the DGT’s data for this research.
For purpose in this research, the assumption of each variables is very important.
Based on the above framework, we collect data as follows as Figure 2:
a. Tax Compliance is the attitude of taxpayers on filling tax return on due date.
b. Power of authority is measured by the approach of tax authority to deal with tax
compliance in tax administration system, therefore in this research, we divide the tax
authority’s strategies become soft approach, medium approach, and hard approach.
Soft approach is measured by letter of inquiry declared by tax authority to taxpayer,
medium approach is measured by report of audit result issued by tax authority on the
audit carried out to taxpayer, and hard approach is measured of letter of reprimand
sent to taxpayer.
c. Trust in authority is the attitude of taxpayers in addressing fairness value, in this case
fairness is redistributive fairness which is the attitude of taxpayers to address the
action of tax authorities ensuring that the taxpayer comply with the tax law.
Therefore, trust in authority is measured according to tax authority approach. If tax
authority using soft approach, then trust in authority is measured by how many
taxpayers response to letter of inquiry, and if tax authority using medium approach,
then trust in authority is measured by how many taxpayer do not raise appeal of tax
assessment, and lastly if tax authority using hard approach, then trust in authority is
measured by how many taxpayers make appropriate payment according to tax return.
Figure 1
Data structure
Source: Author
Power, Trust, and Institution: Tax Authority VS Taxpayer in Indonesia
1518 Syntax Literate, Vol. 5, No. 12, Desember 2020
Result and Discussion
1.
Result
In the following result, analyses of tax compliance by trust and power are
presented. Table 1 estimated tax compliance over ten years taxing period. In individuals
and firms, tax compliance reveals that there is interaction between trust and power. For
individual, letter of inquiry declared by tax authority as a soft approach to remind
taxpayer of their obligation to submit tax return gives significant effect to tax
compliance, as well as the attitude of taxpayer respond the act of tax authority in the
response of letter of inquiry. In every single letter of inquiry declared to taxpayer will
increase approximately three taxpayers to comply on submitting their tax return in next
period. As well as, if one individual response the inquiry letter will increase around two
taxpayers to comply in next period. However, in firms, the trust of taxpayer seems not
relevant to affect the tax compliance, even though the power of authority contributes
more significant effect.
In the case of category of income, it shows that first category of incomes gives
high contribution to tax compliance instead of others as well as in firms. Similarly,
other than first category income in individuals and firms shows the same level of low
tax compliance. The location itself describes that tax compliance in location 2 is better
than the others, while in individual, location 5 is the worst.
This result depicts that soft approach using by authority to increase tax
compliance is more effective in individual taxpayer rather than firms to increase tax
compliance, even though both affect tax compliance itself. Furthermore, interaction
between power and trust gives significant affect for tax compliance. This finding
supports the previous research by (Kircher, 2008) where synergistic climate could bring
the good environment for taxpayer to increase tax compliance.
David Mondru Sihotang
Syntax Literate, Vol. 5, No. 12, Desember 2020 1519
Table 1
Estimation Results Using Soft Approach
Dependent variable: timely_report
SOFT APPROACH
Variables
Individual
Firms
PLS
FE
PLS
inquiry_letter
4.6664549***
(0.7820679)
3.6178034**
*
(0.5127167)
4.2204344***
(0.4975907)
inquiry_respons
e
0.10764377
(1.065195)
-0.22195026
(0.742424)
-0.7748479
(0 .7265071)
inquiry_letter x
inquiry_respons
e
-.00139549***
(0.0003314)
-
0.0039357**
*
(0.000489)
-
0.00347962***
(0.0005547)
inc_category 1
inc_category 2
inc_category 3
inc_category 4
base
-1539.3139***
(48.66242)
-1551.0226***
(49.3944)
-1493.5121***
(45.13985)
base
-658.44372***
(16.81452)
-665.43995***
(16.9642)
Loc 1
Loc 2
Loc 3
Loc 4
Loc 5
-265.61919***
(63.91021)
base
-549.99477***
(71.81555)
-410.5766***
(77.52387)
-673.88587***
(85.35835)
-43.75854**
(16.20772)
base
-59.027975***
(16.06863)
-34.386131
(24.7702)
-38.188883
(32.98498)
Constant
1632.8328***
(52.05414)
271.78352**
*
(7.688762)
647.64521***
(18.65834)
Obs (N)
R2
2903
0.55683572
4496
0.49219544
4496
0.64773935
Source: Data Processed, Stata 2019
Reported figures are the estimated coefficients followed by their standard errors.
*,**,*** denote statistical significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level
of significance respectively Standard errors in parentheses.
Different result is shown in Table 2. Using medium approach as a power of
authority, the audit gives promising result to increase tax compliance. For individual,
every single audit result issued by tax authority will increase around thirty-seven
taxpayer to submit tax return on time, as well as firms, every single audit result will
enhance eight taxpayers to comply in next period. The interaction between power and
trust shows significant effect, it means tax compliance needs trust and power to increase
Power, Trust, and Institution: Tax Authority VS Taxpayer in Indonesia
1520 Syntax Literate, Vol. 5, No. 12, Desember 2020
tax compliance. The attitude of taxpayer to see the audit approach taken by tax authority
and response it by non-appealing notice of tax assessment results the positive and
significant effect to increase the tax compliance. In individual and firms, for every
single individual or firms who trust in authority by responding non-appealing tax notice
will increase four taxpayers to comply in next period. Nevertheless, in one percent level
of significance, power shows bigger magnitude than trust in enhancing tax compliance,
even though the interaction between them is needed to shape the tax compliance over
time.
In the case category of income, the result shows that more taxpayer in individual
or firms in first category submit their tax return on time rather than the other income
categories. The level of compliance in fourth category in individual income shows the
worst result. Meanwhile, in the location category, location 2 in individual provides more
taxpayers to comply rather than others. However, it is different with firms’
characteristic where location 5 shows higher level of compliance.
This result shows that medium approach using by authority to increase tax
compliance is effective both in individual taxpayer and firms to increase tax
compliance. Furthermore, interaction between power and trust gives significant affect
for tax compliance. This finding supports the previous research by (Kircher, 2008)
where tax audit gives significant effect to increase tax compliance.
David Mondru Sihotang
Syntax Literate, Vol. 5, No. 12, Desember 2020 1521
Table 2
Estimation Results Using Medium Approach
Dependent variable: timely_report
MEDIUM APPROACH
Variables
Individual
Firms
FE
PLS
FE
PLS
audit_result
37.092424***
(3.488504)
50.607931***
(4.568338)
8.6677912***
(0.7245142)
4.5606188***
(0.7326501)
nonappeal_notice
3.9985074***
(0.6685164)
7.0861897***
(0.9979385)
4.2248835***
(0.2555032)
6.1964515***
(0.2561863)
audit_result*
nonappeal_notice
-0.056242***
(0.0127108)
-
0.07153184**
(0.0225071)
-
0.03043773***
(0.0043542)
-
0.02900315***
(0.0061839)
inc_category 1
inc_category 2
inc_category 3
inc_category 4
base
-
758.94363***
(43.97821)
-
772.87264***
(45.05119)
-
900.22738***
(45.05119)
base
-465.65638***
(10.3645)
-486.06314***
(12.184)
Loc 1
Loc 2
Loc 3
Loc 4
Loc 5
-25.92708
(48.02424)
base
-
238.49696***
(45.85839)
-
224.71364***
(58.49077)
-
213.47179***
(62.31318)
-16.999666
(9.977217)
base
-43.914031***
(10.6341)
29.720258
(16.64786)
71.778686**
(24.10101)
Constant
597.86642***
(32.25874)
725.13475***
(47.95998)
102.19916***
(11.18469)
395.14274***
(13.18402)
Obs (N)
R2
3787
0.25494373
3787
0.58298672
7622
0.41156787
7622
0.66923784
Source: Data Processed, Stata 2019
Reported figures are the estimated coefficients followed by their standard errors.
*,*,*** denote statistical significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level
of significance respectively Standard errors in parentheses.
In terms of hard approach as power of authority, Table 3 presents interesting
result in level of tax compliance. Compared to soft approach and medium approach as
the power of authority, hard approach gives lower expectation to enhance tax
Power, Trust, and Institution: Tax Authority VS Taxpayer in Indonesia
1522 Syntax Literate, Vol. 5, No. 12, Desember 2020
compliance. In individual, power gives insignificant and small effect to tax compliance,
even though trust shows significant effect. The interaction between trust and power
seems irrelevant even though it is significant. It means reprimand letters issued by tax
authority do not give deterrent effect for taxpayer, and it is only because of trust and the
willingness of taxpayer to contribute in tax payment makes tax compliance increase
over time. However, it seems different in firms’ case, power and trust are significant in
increasing tax compliance. In every single letter of reprimand issued by tax authority
will increase one taxpayer to comply in next period, as well as in every single firm are
willing to pay appropriate tax according to tax return, it will increase one taxpayer to
comply in next period. However, the interaction between power and trust seems
insignificant and only gives small effect.
Based on income category, in individual and firms, first category of income still
shows similar result as soft and medium approach. Taxpayers in the first category
shows higher level of tax compliance compared to other categories. However, in the
category of location gives vary results. In individual, location 4 looks promising in
higher tax compliance compared to other locations, but in firms, location 3 shows
highest tax compliance.
This result depicts that hard approach using by authority to increase tax
compliance is more effective in firms rather than individual to increase tax compliance.
In individual, power gives insignificant and small effect to tax compliance and the
interaction between trust and power seems irrelevant, even though it is significant. This
finding supports the previous research by (Kircher, 2008) where antagonistic climate
could bring the bad environment for taxpayer to increase tax compliance. Other than
that, fine is more effective than audit, however, it only affects slightly tax compliance.
David Mondru Sihotang
Syntax Literate, Vol. 5, No. 12, Desember 2020 1523
Table 3
Estimation Results Using Hard Approach
Dependent variable: timely_report
HARD APPROACH
Variables
Individual
Firms
FE
PLS
FE
PLS
reprimand_letter
1.7118044
(1.006381)
1.7194985**
(0.6672883)
0.7859334***
(0.2060979)
0.545007***
(0.1335022)
appr_payment
0.8197314***
(0.0490088)
0.99736011***
(0.0234414)
0.81706914***
(0.0252266)
0.981404***
(0.0108989)
reprimand_letter
x appr_payment
-0.00044036*
(0.0001845)
-0.00039681**
(0.0001503)
-0.00008744
(0.0001213)
-0.00011545
(0.0000716)
inc_category 1
inc_category 2
inc_category 3
inc_category 4
base
-139.8603***
(26.88124)
-140.14829***
(27.30365)
-143.40599***
(25.99174)
base
-44.87145***
(6.061467)
-46.52465***
(6.355565)
Loc 1
Loc 2
Loc 3
Loc 4
Loc 5
-25.67881
(23.25149)
base
-13.970905
(33.10312)
20.017938
(32.78685)
-83.720394**
(30.34148)
-17.1297***
(4.867738)
base
20.36476***
(5.196588)
-6.3734585
(8.450918)
-1.405744
(15.93407)
Constant
217.68939***
(37.91522)
140.73787***
(29.18704)
78.775169***
(10.95906)
50.96279***
(6.863292)
Obs (N)
R2
5782
0.49481737
5782
0.89235212
8515
0.68612115
8515
0.94519923
Source: Data Processed, Stata 2019
Reported figures are the estimated coefficients followed by their standard errors.
*,**,*** denote statistical significance at the 10 per cent,5 per cent, and 1 per cent level
of significance respectively Standard errors in parentheses.
2.
Discussion
The findings show vary level of tax compliance depends on how power of
authority used and trust in authority comprehend with the perceived of fairness in every
act of authority. For individual, soft and medium approach give high impact for
taxpayers to comply. However, hard approach is insignificant and give small effect.
Furthermore, for firms, power of authority gives high effect for taxpayers to comply. It
means, tax regulation and how tax authority using their power to enforce compliance
gives high effect in firms instead of individuals.
Meanwhile, trust in authority matter for tax compliance. The attitude of taxpayers
in perceiving fairness highly contributes to tax compliance. However, the interaction
Power, Trust, and Institution: Tax Authority VS Taxpayer in Indonesia
1524 Syntax Literate, Vol. 5, No. 12, Desember 2020
between power and trust do not always occur, in firms while tax authority gives hard
approach, then the interaction only gives small effect and insignificant. Income and
location as control variables gives us interesting part in this study. We find that the
higher the taxpayer income, the lower the tax compliance. It means, that individuals or
firms who have lower income tend to more comply than wealthy individuals or firms
over time. Similarly, Java, Bali and Nusa Tenggara in location 2 still give higher tax
compliance than other islands in Indonesia. It shows that concentration of taxpayer still
located in this area.
Indonesia tax reform should put attention in how authority using their power and
comprehend with public trust to enhance tax compliance. In figure 3, the interaction
between tax authority and taxpayer needs institution as a rule of game which give
incentives in shaping the tax reform. In the institution framework, tax authority should
design simple procedures and regulation and ready to change at any time to adapt with
taxpayer behavior. From the results above, we can see that hard approach is not very
significant in enhance compliance, but soft and medium approach are more promising to
induce high compliance. Tax authority needs to identify the compliance risk and
develop strategies to deal with this problem. The hard approach should be the last way
to improve compliance, and building trust is the main thing. Practically, simplify of tax
reporting and tax payment, create easiness in accessing information, and mapping the
audit risk are most sensible way in tax reform.
Trust in authority in other way is formed by norms of behavior among society.
The more opportunity of taxpayers to contribute in society will enhance the public trust.
Trust will breed trust, and voluntary compliance is the result of trust. Perceived of
fairness and fair procedures are determinant to lead the positive attitude towards tax
compliance (Verboon & Goslinga, 2009).
Figure 2
Tax authority and Taxpayer on Institutional Framework
Source: Author
David Mondru Sihotang
Syntax Literate, Vol. 5, No. 12, Desember 2020 1525
Conclusion
Tax compliance should be seen in broad perspective how the relationship between
power of authority and trust in authority shaping the institution overtime. Based on the
results above, for individual taxpayer, soft and medium approach give significant affect
in tax compliance, while hard approach shows insignificant effect. However, for firms,
power of authority is significant in increasing tax compliance. Taxpayer’s attitude
towards authority approach that represents tax authority gives significant effect as well
to increase tax compliance. Furthermore, the significant effect of interaction between
power of authority and trust in authority reflects that to increase tax compliance is by
developing the strong relationship between power and trust in institution In the end,
how tax authority using their power to enforce compliance gives high effect in firms
instead of individuals. Using soft and medium approach are the most effective way for
individuals.
Power, Trust, and Institution: Tax Authority VS Taxpayer in Indonesia
1526 Syntax Literate, Vol. 5, No. 12, Desember 2020
BIBLIOGRAFI
Allingham, Michael G., & Sandmo, Agnar. (1972). Income tax evasion: A theoretical
analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 1(3–4), 323–338.
Alm, J., Bahl, R., & Murray, M. N. (1993). Are there positive spillovers from direct
foreign investment?: Evidence from panel data for Morocco. Journal of
Development Economics, 42(1), 51–74.
Faizal, Sellywati Mohd, Palil, Mohd Rizal, Maelah, Ruhanita, & Ramli, Rosiati. (2017).
Perception on justice, trust and tax compliance behavior in Malaysia. Kasetsart
Journal of Social Sciences, 38(3), 226–232.
Feld, Lars P., & Frey, Bruno S. (2003). Trust breeds trust: How taxpayers are treated.
Economics of Governance, 3(2), 87–99.
Fortin, Bernard, Lacroix, Guy, & Villeval, Marie Claire. (2007). Tax evasion and social
interactions. Journal of Public Economics, 91(11–12), 2089–2112.
Gangl, Katharina, Hofmann, Eva, & Kirchler, Erich. (2015). Tax authorities’ interaction
with taxpayers: A conception of compliance in social dilemmas by power and trust.
New Ideas in Psychology, 37, 13–23.
Hessing, Dick J., Elffers, Henk, Robben, Henry S. J., & Webley, Paul. (1992). Does
deterrence deter? Measuring the effect of deterrence on tax compliance in field
studies and experimental studies. Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and
Enforcement, 291–305.
Kircher, E. E. (2008). Enforced versus voluntary tax compliance: The Slippery
Framework. Journal of Economic Psychology, 29(2), 210–225.
North, Douglass C. (1994). Economic performance through time. The American
Economic Review, 84(3), 359–368.
Parlaungan, Gorga. (2017). The tax morale of individual taxpayers in Indonesia. Curtin
University.
Prihandini, Wiwiek. (2018). The optimum level of tax compliance based on power of
authority and trust in an antagonistic climate. https://ideas.repec.org/a/ers/journl/v
xxy2017i3bp362-373.html
Verboon, Peter, & Goslinga, Sjoerd. (2009). The role of fairness in tax compliance.
Netherlands Journal of Psychology, 65(4), 136–145.
Wahl, I., Kastlunger, B., & Kirchler, E. (2010). Trust in Authorities and Power to
Enforece Tax Compliance: An Empirical Analysis of the. Law and Policy. Journal
of Economic Psychology, 29(2), 210–225.
David Mondru Sihotang
Syntax Literate, Vol. 5, No. 12, Desember 2020 1527
Wenzel, Michael. (2004). The social side of sanctions: Personal and social norms as
moderators of deterrence. Law and Human Behavior, 28(5), 547–567.
Widodo, Widi, Djefris, Deddy, & Wardhani, Eka Aryani. (2010). Moralitas, budaya,
dan kepatuhan pajak. Jakarta: Alfabeta.
Yitzhaki, Shlomo. (1974). A Note on Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Approach.
Journal of Public Economics, 3(2), 2011–2202.